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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the Supreme Court in Stern v. Marshall ruled that bank-
ruptcy courts, as adjuncts of Article III courts, do not have the consti-
tutional authority to enter final judgments on state law counterclaims 
in bankruptcy proceedings.1  In doing so, the Court appeared to be 
diverging from its most recent precedent, which recognized a more 
expansive Congressional authority to establish non-Article III adjudi-
catory bodies, and reverting back to the more restrictive, public 
rights/private rights dichotomy in determining the constitutionality 
of non-Article III tribunals.  This Comment seeks to explore this gap 
in legal scholarship, and argues that the holding in Stern has forced 
administrative agencies and legislative courts to occupy a position of 
uncertainty as to their constitutionality within the Supreme Court’s 
Article III analysis.  Before delving into the doctrinal inconsistencies 
of Stern and its potential implications on non-Article III adjudicatory 
bodies, this Comment will address the key points in the Supreme 
Court’s precedent that are relevant to the discussion. 
Article III of the United States Constitution requires the judicial 
power of the United States to “be vested in one Supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”2  Furthermore, it specifies that “[t]he judicial power 
shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States . . . .”3  The Framers of the Con-
stitution believed this was not only necessary to preserve the inde-
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pendence of the judiciary from encroachment by other branches of 
the government, but also necessary to preserve individual liberty.4  
Over time, the Supreme Court began to recognize limited exceptions 
in which it would be constitutionally permissible to substitute Article I 
tribunals for Article III courts.  Based on its rulings in prior deci-
sions,5 the Court articulated three categories of valid, non-Article III 
adjudicatory authority in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co.:  territorial courts, military tribunals, and matters involv-
ing public rights.6 
This Comment will focus primarily on the development of the 
public rights doctrine, its growth, abandonment, and revival follow-
ing the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall.  Stern has gar-
nered much attention over the past three years due to its lack of clari-
ty in specifying the parameters of Article III and the Separation of 
Powers Doctrine.  While many legal scholars have examined the im-
plications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern for bankruptcy 
courts and their authority to preside over claims arising out of bank-
ruptcy proceedings, very few have analyzed Stern’s implications out-
side of the bankruptcy context—specifically, the legitimacy of admin-
istrative agencies and other legislative courts in the post-Stern era.7 
This Comment examines the implications of Stern on the authority 
of non-Article III adjudicatory bodies.  In particular, it will examine 
Congress’s delegation of Article I authority to magistrate judges un-
der the Federal Magistrates Act as well as the Act’s constitutionality 
under the majority’s reasoning in Stern.  While some scholars have ar-
gued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern signifies the Court’s 
return to a more formalistic approach, this Comment argues that the 
Court, in attempting to reconcile Stern with its earlier decisions in 
 
 4 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In order to lay a due foundation for that 
separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain 
extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident 
that each department should have a will of its own . . . .”). 
 5 See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857) (recognizing Congress’s authority 
to establish non-Article III military courts); Den, ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Im-
provement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855) (upholding the constitutionality of legisla-
tive courts and administrative agencies created by Congress to adjudicate cases involving 
“public rights”); Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (ac-
knowledging Congress’s authority to create non-Article III territorial courts). 
 6 458 U.S. 50, 66–67 (1982). 
 7 See, e.g., Joshua D. Talicska, Jurisdictional Game Changer or Narrow Holding?  Discussing the 
Potential Effects of Stern v. Marshall and Offering a Roadmap through the Milieu, 9 SETON HALL 
CIR. REV. 31, 42–43 (2012) (interpreting Stern within the context of the history of bank-
ruptcy system in the United States). 
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Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.8 and Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission v. Schor, 9 occupies a precarious position between 
formalism and functionalism that is both confusing and doctrinally 
inconsistent.  One of the implications of this inconsistency is that it 
places non-Article III tribunals in a constitutional limbo that, without 
clarification from the Supreme Court, may raise serious questions 
about their constitutionality post-Stern. 
Part I of this Comment examines the evolution of the Public 
Rights Doctrine as well as the gradual expansion of non-Article III 
tribunals leading up to Stern v. Marshall.  Part II analyzes the doctrinal 
inconsistencies in the Court’s opinion in Stern v. Marshall, and Part III 
discusses the potential implications of Stern in the context of magis-
trate judges. 
I.  LEGISLATIVE COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
A.  The Rise of the Public Rights Doctrine 
The Supreme Court established the notion of “public rights” for 
the first time in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.10  In 
Murray’s Lessee, the Court acknowledged that while Congress may not 
“withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, 
is the subject of the suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiral-
ty[,]” there may be matters involving public rights “which may be pre-
sented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on 
them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which 
Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of 
the United States.”11 
Nearly four decades later, the Supreme Court revisited the public 
rights exception in Crowell v. Benson, which upheld a federal employ-
ee compensation program under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor 
Worker’s Compensation Act.12  In Crowell, the Court distinguished 
 
 8 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
 9 478 U.S. 833 (1986) 
 10 59 U.S. at 272.  In Murray’s Lessee, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the 
Department of Treasury, pursuant to a federal statute, can deprive an individual of his 
property without the exercise of judicial power of the United States. 
 11 Id. at 284. 
 12 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).  Prior to the Longshoremen’s Act, there were other federal regu-
latory schemes in place, including the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which engaged in policy-making, rule-
formulation, enforcement tasks and adjudication.  Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Archi-
tecture:  Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 238 (1990). 
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public rights, which “arise between the Government and persons sub-
ject to its authority in connection with the performance of the consti-
tutional functions of the executive or legislative departments,”13 from 
private rights, which involve “the liability of one individual to another 
under the law as defined.”14  The Court found that the federal work-
er’s compensation scheme clearly fell within the purview of the pub-
lic rights exception because “[b]y the Longshoremen’s Act, Congress 
created fact-finding and fact-gathering tribunals, supplementing the 
courts and entrusted with the power to make initial determinations in 
matters within, and not outside, ordinary judicial purview.”15 
The Court in Crowell appeared to align its holding to traditional 
conceptions of the Public Rights Doctrine.  But in reality, the Court 
had proposed a novel idea in upholding the constitutionality of the 
Longshoremen’s Act.  According to Professor James E. Pfander, “the 
early history of public rights exception did not support granting 
Congress broad authority to substitute Article I tribunals for Article 
III courts.”16  In fact, whereas the Court in Murray’s Lessee “upheld 
Congress’s power . . . to transform the common law action against the 
executive officer into one against the government itself . . . it did not 
suggest that such an action might be assigned to an Article I tribu-
nal.”17  In contrast, the Court in Crowell justified upholding the Long-
shoremen’s Act on the ground that the purpose of the federal work-
er’s compensation board was “to withdraw from the courts, subject to 
the power of judicial review, a class of controversy which experience 
has shown can be more effectively and expeditiously handled in the 
first instance by a special and expert tribunal.”18  The Court’s decision 
in Crowell was significant in that it not only defined but also consider-
ably expanded the Public Rights Doctrine first articulated by the 
Court in Murray’s Lessee, which provided the foundation for Congress 
to institute a vast and wide range of legislative and administrative 
bodies throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries19 
 
 13 285 U.S. at 50. 
 14 Id. at 51. 
 15 Id. at 88. 
 16 James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United 
States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 760 (2004). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 88. 
 19 See Bator, supra note 12 at 238–39 (concluding that the Court’s decision in Crowell has 
served as “an enriching source of important institutional flexibility and innovation” that 
has enabled Congress to establish a wide variety of adjudicative institutions “dealing with 
one or many subject matters and administering a huge variety of statutory schemes 
through a huge variety of processes”). 
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B.  The Expansion of the Public Rights Doctrine and the Adoption of Schor’s 
Balancing Approach 
Following in the footsteps of Crowell, the Supreme Court’s two 
most recent cases leading up to its decision in Stern v. Marshall ap-
peared to signal a trend towards validating expansive, non-Article III 
adjudicatory authority.  In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prod-
ucts Co., the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), which 
required private parties to arbitrate disputes about cost-sharing in 
connection with the registration of pesticides under the Act.20  Based 
on the Court’s reasoning in Crowell, FIFRA most likely would have ex-
ceeded the boundaries of the Public Rights Doctrine since the case 
concerned a dispute between two private parties.21  Nevertheless, the 
Court found that the mandatory and binding arbitration scheme un-
der FIFRA does not violate Article III and separation of powers be-
cause the right to compensation under the Act arises under FIFRA 
and “does not depend on or replace a right to such compensation 
under state law.”22 
By upholding the constitutionality of FIFRA and its mandatory ar-
bitration scheme, the Court in Thomas effectively expanded the Pub-
lic Rights Doctrine to encompass matters involving two private parties 
that arise, at a minimum, from a federal statutory scheme.  The 
Court, however, went one step further in Thomas and rejected the 
public rights/private rights dichotomy as not determinative in Article 
III analysis. 23  From the Court’s perspective a proper interpretation of 
Article III affords the Federal Government sufficient flexibility to rely 
on administrative tribunals to help carry out the proper functions of 
the judiciary.24 
Following in the same trajectory, the Court in Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission v. Schor25 granted Congress even greater latitude 
by adopting a flexible balancing test to determine the nature and ex-
tent of the non-Article III tribunal’s intrusion into the Judicial 
 
 20 473 U.S. 568, 573 (1985). 
 21 C.f. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50 (defining “public rights” as relating to matters arising between 
the government and the individual subject to its authority). 
 22 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584. 
 23 Id. at 585–86 
 24 Id. at 599 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 25 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
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Branch.26  The litigation in Schor arose from a Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) regulation that enabled the CFTC to 
adjudicate counterclaims, including state law counterclaims, arising 
out of the same transaction as the claim at issue in the CFTC repara-
tions proceeding.27  In determining whether the federal statutory 
scheme violated separation of powers, the Court identified four fac-
tors for lower courts to consider in deciding on the Article III chal-
lenge:  (1) “the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicat-
ed”; (2) “the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the 
range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III 
courts”; (3) “the extent to which the ‘essential attributes of judicial 
power’ are reserved to Article III courts”; and (4) “the concerns that 
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.”28 
Here, the Court found that “the relative allocation of powers be-
tween the CFTC and Article III courts . . . demonstrates that the con-
gressional scheme does not impermissibly intrude on the province of 
the judiciary.”29  In its analysis, the Court readily acknowledged that 
the state law counterclaim asserted in the CFTC proceeding was a 
“private” right and “is therefore a claim of the kind assumed to be at 
the ‘core’ of matters normally reserved to Article III courts.”30  De-
spite this fact, the Court emphasized that measuring the extent of en-
croachment into Article III may be more accurately determined by 
looking at the substance of what Congress has done as opposed to 
simply adopting a categorical approach.31  According to the Court, 
the private nature of a claim made the danger of encroachment on 
judicial powers by other branches of the government more likely.32  
Nevertheless, this characteristic alone was not determinative in Arti-
 
 26 Justice Byron White proposed the application of a balancing approach in Article III anal-
ysis in his dissenting opinion in Northern Pipeline.  See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 114 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (citing case precedents to ar-
gue that the Court has always weighed the value of the Article I court against the values 
furthered by a strict adherence to Article III). 
 27 Schor, at 837; see 7 U.S.C. § 12a(5) (2012) (“[The Commission is authorized] to make and 
promulgate such rules and regulations as, in the judgment of the Commission, are rea-
sonably necessary to effectuate any of the provisions or to accomplish any of the purposes 
of this chapter.”); 7 U.S.C. § 18(b) (2012) (“The Commission may promulgate such rules, 
regulations, and orders as it deems necessary or appropriate for the efficient and expedi-
tious administration of this section . . .  [and] may prescribe, . . . without limita-
tion . . . service of pleadings or orders, the nature and scope of discovery, counterclaims, 
[or] motion practice . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 28 Schor, 476 U.S. at 851. 
 29 Id. at 851–52. 
 30 Id. at 853. 
 31 Id. at 854. 
 32 Id. 
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cle III analysis.33  Weighed against “the legislative interest in conven-
ience and efficiency,” the CFTC’s assumption of jurisdiction over the 
common law counterclaim did not violate Article III of the Constitu-
tion.34  Specifically, the Court noted that CFTC deals “only with a 
‘particularized area of law’” as opposed to a broad grant of adjudica-
tory authority, and it “does not exercise ‘all ordinary powers of dis-
trict courts,’” such as presiding over jury trials.35 
Post-Schor, it appeared as though the Court would permit almost 
any act of Congressional authority that falls short of a blatant usurpa-
tion of the authority of Article III courts.  According to some schol-
ars, Schor stands for two key propositions.  First, the Court would find 
“there is no great danger to structural values when Congress simply 
transfers some matters from Article III courts to alternative adjudica-
tive bodies.”36  Even in cases where Congress grants non-Article III 
tribunals the authority to preside over matters traditionally reserved 
for Article III courts, Article III concerns would not automatically be 
implicated under the Court’s rationale.  Second, where structural 
values are not at stake, Congress should be afforded great latitude 
with respect to the creation of non-Article III courts.37  Based on the 
Court’s reasoning it is clear that the role of the public rights doctrine 
in Article III analysis is almost obsolete and the nature and extent of 
the non-Article III tribunal is determined by a balancing test. 
C.  Stern v. Marshall and the Supreme Court’s Return to the Public Rights 
Doctrine 
The landscape of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leading up 
to Stern v. Marshall seemed to suggest that the Court would grant 
Congress significant leeway in its authority to create non-Article III 
adjudicatory bodies.38  This, however, proved not to be the case.  In 
Stern, the Court addressed the issue of whether bankruptcy courts, 
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1984 (“Act”), may enter final judgment 
 
 33 See, e.g., N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 109 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the private 
nature of a claim is not determinative in assessing whether the act of Congress has violat-
ed Article III). 
 34 Schor, 476 U.S. at 858, 863. 
 35 Id. at 852–53 (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85). 
 36 George D. Brown, Article III as a Fundamental Value—The Demise of Northern Pipeline and 
its Implications for Congressional Power, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 79 (1988). 
 37 Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article III:  Legislative Court Doctrine 
in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 115 (1988). 
 38 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 36, at 76 (concluding that the Court did the functional equiva-
lent of overruling Northern Pipeline by replacing the analysis with one which will always 
come out in favor of the congressional choice). 
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on state law counterclaims in bankruptcy proceedings.  The respond-
ent in Stern had filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the re-
spondent’s defamation claim against the petitioner was not dis-
chargeable in the petitioner’s bankruptcy proceeding.39  In response 
to the complaint, the petitioner had filed a state law counterclaim 
against the respondent for tortious interference, for which the bank-
ruptcy court had issued judgment in favor of the petitioner.40 
Under Schor’s four-factor balancing test, the Supreme Court 
should have upheld the bankruptcy court’s entry of final judgment 
on the petitioner’s state law counterclaim.41  Instead, the Court held 
that the provision of the Act granting bankruptcy courts authority to 
preside over all counterclaims arising from or related to the bank-
ruptcy proceeding violated Article III.42  The Court’s reasoning in 
Stern, in many ways, baffled and troubled the lower courts as well as 
legal scholars because it not only indicated a divergence from the 
trend towards granting Congress greater authority in establishing 
non-Article III tribunals, it also signaled a reversion back to the appli-
cation of a more restrictive Article III analysis utilized by the Court in 
Northern Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe Line.43 
Northern Pipeline, a predecessor to Thomas and Schor, was also a case 
regarding the adjudicatory authority of bankruptcy courts.  In North-
ern Pipeline, a plurality of the Court held that the bankruptcy court, as 
a non-Article III tribunal, did not have constitutional authority to 
render final decisions on the parties’ breach of contract and warran-
ty, misrepresentation, coercion, and duress claims even though the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 authorized it to do so.44  Citing a long line of 
precedent, the Court determined that Congress may establish non-
Article III tribunals only under three, specific instances:  territorial 
courts, military tribunals, and matters involving public rights.45  Ac-
cording to the plurality, these three, narrow exceptions did not vio-
late Article III because “the grant of [such] power to the Legislative 
and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so excep-
tional that the congressional assertion of a power to create legislative 
 
 39 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Cf. id. at 2624–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (determining that the application of Schor’s bal-
ancing factors weighed in favor of granting bankruptcy courts authority to adjudicate 
state law counterclaims in bankruptcy proceedings). 
 42 Id. at 2608 (majority opinion). 
 43 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 44 Id. at 87 (plurarity opinion). 
 45 Id. at 64–67; see also id. at 103–05 (White, J., dissenting) (describing the plurality opinion’s 
holding). 
Dec. 2015] NON-ARTICLE III ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY 733 
 
courts was consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitu-
tional mandate of separation of power.”46 
Since bankruptcy courts did not fall under the category of territo-
rial courts or military tribunals, the Court considered whether this 
exercise of legislative power fell within the public rights exception.  
First, the Court noted that “a matter of public rights must at a mini-
mum arise ‘between the government and others.’”47  Second, while 
recognizing that Congress “possesses substantial discretion to pre-
scribe the manner in which that right may be adjudicated—including 
the assignment to an adjunct of some functions historically per-
formed by judges,” the Court concluded that it does not possess the 
same degree of discretion in assigning traditionally judicial power to 
adjuncts engaged in the adjudication of rights not created by Con-
gress.48  Under this framework, the Court concluded that the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978 fell outside of the limits of the public rights doc-
trine because Congress had granted bankruptcy courts authority to 
preside over matters traditionally reserved for Article III courts.49  
Furthermore, in invalidating the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, the Court 
effectively “refus[ed] to recognize a new exception to Article III, 
and . . . upheld the traditional view that only Article III courts may 
exercise the judicial power.”50 
The Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline, which signified a valiant 
effort “to block any further erosion of the role of article III courts as 
the adjudicative arm of the national government,”51 garnered much 
criticism from scholars who found the analysis to be doctrinally in-
consistent.52  Furthermore, these scholars found the Court’s decision 
to be troubling in the sense that “[r]ead broadly, Justice [William] 
Brennan’s opinion cast[] doubt upon the validity of a wide range of 
non-article III adjudicative mechanisms, including decision making 
by administrative agencies.”53  The Court’s subsequent decisions in 
Thomas and Schor, however, appeared to reaffirm the validity of non-
Article III tribunals.  In Thomas, the Court “permitted resolution by 
 
 46 Id. at 64 (plurarity opinion). 
 47 Id. at 69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). 
 48 Id. at 80–82. 
 49 Id. at 87. 
 50 Pfander, supra note 16, at 770. 
 51 Brown, supra note 36, at 65. 
 52 See, e.g., id. at 55 (noting that commentators were critical of the decision); Martin H. 
Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 
DUKE L.J. 197, 199–200 (1983) (asserting that an absolute interpretation of Article III 
would place heavy restrictions on the work of administrative agencies). 
 53 Brown, supra note 36, at 55. 
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non-article III arbitrators of disputes which, though implicating con-
gressionally created rights, were between private parties.”54  Similarly, 
Schor permitted a non-Article III tribunal to adjudicate disputes be-
tween private parties implicating rights arising under the common 
law, which “seemed to be just the sort of claim that Northern Pipe-
line . . . had held beyond the power of a non-article III court to adju-
dicate.”55  The Court in both Thomas and Schor had essentially “reject-
ed attempts to extend Northern Pipeline and accorded Congress 
considerable latitude in choosing adjudicative mechanisms,”56 and 
this doctrinal inconsistency between Northern Pipeline, on the one 
hand, and Thomas and Schor, on the other, led many scholars to pre-
sume that the Court had implicitly overturned Northern Pipeline.57 
What is significant about the holding in Northern Pipeline for the 
purposes of this Comment is not so much that it is incompatible with 
the Court’s subsequent decisions in Thomas and Schor, but rather that 
the Court in Stern adopted and attempted to reconcile Northern Pipe-
line’s doctrinal framework with those of Thomas and Schor, even 
though doing so created grave inconsistencies in the Court’s Article 
III jurisprudence.58 
II.  STERN AND THE DOCTRINAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE SUPREME 
COURT’S ARTICLE III ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Stern created a lot of confusion 
among lower courts and constitutional scholars because it diverged 
significantly from the Court’s decisions in Thomas and Schor; and be-
cause the Court failed to reconcile the logical and methodological 
inconsistencies in its analyses, making it almost impossible for the 
lower courts to formulate a clear, concise rule.59  In particular, “the 
 
 54 See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 37, at 111–12 (determining that Northern Pipeline would 
have excluded the regulatory scheme in Thomas and would have delegitimized many of 
the institutions of the modern administrative state). 
 55 Id. at 1010. 
 56 Brown, supra note 36, at 55. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Following the Court’s decision in Schor, many scholars concluded that Northern Pipeline’s 
“arbitrary distinctions between the public and private and between article I courts and ad-
juncts” were no longer part of the Court’s analysis in deciding the constitutionality of 
non-Article III adjudicatory authority.  Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal 
Judiical Power:  From Murray’s Lessee through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 865–
66 (1986). 
 59 See Jonathan C. Lipson & Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, Stern, Seriously:  The Article I Judicial 
Power, Fraudulent Transfers, and Leveraged Buyouts, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (2013) 
(“Stern’s indeterminacy reflects the fact that it is difficult to make sense of its ‘holding’ 
and any ‘rule’ that would follow from it.”). 
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Court’s broad rhetoric about the separation of powers ma[de] un-
clear how far the opinion reache[d].”60  The disparate outcomes 
among lower courts arising from the Court’s confusing reasoning in 
Stern have forced the Court to further clarify its holding on the adju-
dicatory authority of bankruptcy courts.61 
While the Court’s recent efforts to better elucidate its Article III 
analysis in Stern have been relatively useful, these efforts have been 
limited to the context of bankruptcy courts and have not provided in-
sight into the implications of Stern on the adjudicatory authority of 
administrative agencies and other non-Article III tribunals.  Further-
more, whereas there has been a wealth of legal scholarship discussing 
the effects of Stern on the future of bankruptcy courts and the doctri-
nal inconsistencies present in the Court’s opinion, few scholars have 
explored the potential implications of Stern on the legitimacy of other 
administrative and legislative bodies. 
A.  Deconstructing the Court’s Decision in Stern 
Despite the Court’s more recent decision in Schor, which rejected 
the public rights/private rights categorical approach as not determi-
native in Article III analysis, the Court in Stern followed the plurality 
decision in Northern Pipeline, which held that whether a matter may be 
heard by a non-Article III tribunal without violating the Constitution 
ultimately depends on if it falls within the “public rights” doctrine.62  
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Congress may not “withdraw 
from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the sub-
ject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.”63  The 
Court effectively reverted back to its discourse in Murray’s Lessee in 
recognizing a category of cases involving “public rights” as an excep-
tion to separation of powers concerns, including:  cases dependent 
upon the will of Congress whether a remedy in the courts shall be al-
 
 60 Id. at 1189. 
 61 See, e.g., Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S.Ct. 2165, 2168 (2014) (“The Consti-
tution does not permit a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on a bankruptcy-
related claim, the relevant statute nevertheless permits a bankruptcy court to issue pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law to be reviewed de novo by the district 
court.”); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2013) (cert. 
granted) (addressing the question of whether a party may waive an Article III objection to 
a bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority to enter final judgment in a core proceed-
ing). 
 62 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2610; see Stephanie J. Bentley, Responding to Stern v. Marshall, 29 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 145, 145 (2012) (discussing the Court’s decision to readopt the categorical 
approach of the public rights doctrine employed in Northern Pipeline). 
 63 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609. 
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lowed at all; those arising between the government and persons sub-
ject to its authority in connection with the performance of the consti-
tutional functions of the executive or legislative departments; and 
claims that derive from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which reso-
lution of the claim by an expert government agency is deemed essen-
tial to a limited regulatory objective within the agency’s authority.64  
What is interesting about the Court’s opinion in Stern is that the 
Court purposefully upheld Thomas and Schor, which had unquestion-
ably adopted a more expansive and flexible approach than Northern 
Pipeline and Stern, as still being valid authority on the Court’s Article 
III jurisprudence.65 
B.  Criticism of Stern v. Marshall 
The Supreme Court’s attempt in Stern to reconcile Northern Pipe-
line with Thomas and Schor has received a great deal of criticism from 
legal scholars.66  Foremost, scholars have called into question the ba-
ses for the Court’s recognition of the Public Rights Doctrine in the 
Article III inquiry—specifically, the Court’s seemingly arbitrary line-
drawing between what the Court defines as “public rights” and all 
other matters that fall outside of this category.67  In Stern, Chief Justice 
John Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized at length the im-
portance of judicial independence and the necessity of having ten-
ured judges not only to preserve the structural principles of separa-
tion of powers but also to protect individual interests.68  According to 
Chief Justice Roberts, Article III of the Constitution does not permit 
the bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on the state law coun-
terclaims because bankruptcy judges lack “the tenure and salary 
 
 64 Id. at 2610. 
 65 See id. at 2614 (distinguishing Thomas on the grounds that the petitioner’s state law coun-
terclaim “does not flow from a federal statutory scheme,” and distinguishing Schor on the 
basis that the petitioner’s counterclaim “is not ‘completely dependent upon’ adjudication 
of a claim created by federal law”). 
 66 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without A Foundation:  Stern v. Marshall, 2011 SUP. 
CT. REV. 183, 185 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s return to formalism is not only incon-
sistent with Thomas and Schor, but also highly unsuitable for interpreting Article III of the 
Constitution). 
 67 See Bator, supra note 12, at 250 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s own confusing and 
contradictory formulations of the “public rights” category renders it very little to no hold-
ing power). 
 68 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609. 
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guarantees of Article III” and only Article III courts have authority to 
preside over claims arising from the common law.69 
As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky points out, however, Chief Justice 
Roberts never actually explains why Congress may constitutionally as-
sign to “legislative” courts for resolution cases involving “public 
rights,”70 while allowing the bankruptcy judge in Stern to enter final 
judgment on the state law counterclaim “compromises these goals,” 
other than the fact that the plurality in Northern Pipeline said so.71  It 
seems that the category of “public rights,” itself, has created much 
discontent among scholars.  Many find that in the modern adminis-
trative state “suffused by statutory and administrative schemes that 
characteristically create complex interdependencies between public 
and private enforcement, it is unintelligible and futile to try to main-
tain rigid distinctions between questions of private and public 
rights.”72 
Furthermore, the actual structure of the Constitution appears to 
support the balancing approach adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Schor.73  According to Professor Paul Bator, this is largely due to the 
fact that the constitutional structure is a scheme of “divided and over-
lapping powers in which a highly sophisticated system of checks and 
balances assures that no branch has exclusive jurisdiction even within 
its own domain.”74  In the alternative, even if the public rights catego-
ry were an “intelligible and manageable category” as opposed to one 
subjected to evolving interpretations, the category still is not “con-
gruent with cases where the use of an article I court or administrative 
agency is valid.”75 
 
 69 Id.; accord Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 
(1855) (holding that Congress may not “withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter 
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiral-
ty”). 
 70 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2610 (“The plurality in Northern Pipeline recognized that there was a 
category of cases involving ‘public rights’ that Congress could constitutionally assign to 
‘legislative’ courts for resolution.”). 
 71 Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 201, 205. 
 72 Bator, supra note 12, at 250. 
 73 See id. at 255 (“Article III is not to be read out of the Constitution; rather, it should be 
read as expressing one value that must be balanced against competing constitutional val-
ues and legislative responsibilities. . . . The burden on Art. III values should be measured 
against the values Congress hopes to serve through the use of Art. I courts.” (quotations 
omitted)); see also Saphire & Solimine, supra note 37, at 117 (“One reason why it is diffi-
cult to identify a valid historical basis for the public-private rights distinction is that there 
is little, if any, support for the doctrine of legislative courts in the historical record.”). 
 74 Bator, supra note 12, at 265 (emphasis omitted). 
 75 Id. at 250. 
738 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
There is a notable shift in the Court’s analysis of non-Article III 
tribunals in Stern from the functional approach applied in Thomas 
and Schor, to a more formal approach.76  In Schor, the Court utilized 
the four-factor balancing test to determine whether the CFTC regula-
tion violated Article III.  In determining that CFTC adhered to Arti-
cle III principles, the Court rejected the stringent categorical ap-
proach and, instead, looked at the nature of the matter to assess 
whether an Article III violation had occurred.77  In contrast, the Court 
in Stern merely looked to see whether or not the counterclaim fell 
under the category of “private rights” without actually measuring the 
extent of the supposed intrusion into the authority of the judiciary.78  
While some scholars have criticized the Court’s adoption of the for-
mal approach in Stern as the cause of the inconsistency in the Court’s 
analysis,79 this Comment argues that the doctrinal inconsistency actu-
ally arises from the Court’s attempt to utilize both the functional and 
formal approaches in its Article III analysis. 
The Court in Stern held that the bankruptcy court’s entry of final 
judgment on the state law counterclaim violated Article III of the 
Constitution.  In response to the dissenting Justices’ argument that 
Congress’s delegation of authority to the bankruptcy court in the par-
ticular instance posed minimal threat to encroaching upon the au-
thority of the judiciary,80 Justice Roberts, writing for the majority stat-
ed that “[a] statute may no more lawfully chip away at the authority of 
the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate it entirely.”81  Looking at 
this quotation, alone, suggests the Court has overruled Thomas and 
Schor.  Moreover, had the Court overruled these two cases, either im-
plicitly or explicitly, it would have been easier for the lower courts 
and legal scholars to deduce a bright-line rule from the Court’s opin-
 
 76 See Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 184 (“The only way to understand Stern v. Marshall is to 
see it as a very formalistic application of legal rules . . . .”); John F. Manning, Separation of 
Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1941 (2011) (“Functionalist deci-
sions presuppose that Congress has plenary authority to compose the government under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, subject only to the requirement that a particular gov-
ernmental scheme maintain a proper overall balance of power.  Formalist opinions, in 
contrast, assume that the constitutional structure adopts a norm of strict separation which 
may sharply limit presumptive congressional power to structure the government.”). 
 77 Schor, 478 U.S. at 855. 
 78 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611. 
 79 See, e.g., Bentley, supra note 62, at 192 (concluding that the Stern decision declined to give 
much guidance on identifying “permissible public rights actions”); Chemerinsky, supra 
note 66, at 206–08 (explaining that the lack of clarity in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Stern has “immediately caused enormous litigation as to its scope and application.”). 
 80 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2625 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 81 Id. at 2620 (majority opinion). 
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ion.  The inconsistency arises, however, because the majority effec-
tively upheld its decisions in Thomas and Schor, which are both in-
compatible with the Court’s formalistic approach in Stern.82  As Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky suggests, the Court could have “recognized and 
disavowed the functional approach of Thomas and Schor . . . .  Or it 
could have embraced the functional approach of Thomas and Schor 
and acknowledged that they had replaced the formalism of Northern 
Pipeline.”83  Instead, the Court attempts to distinguish Stern from 
Thomas and Schor even though under the Court’s reasoning, the fed-
eral statutory schemes in both Thomas and Schor would be declared 
unconstitutional. 
III. THE STATUS OF NON-ARTICLE III TRIBUNALS POST-STERN 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Stern raises a lot of questions 
about the constitutionality of administrative agencies and other legis-
lative courts.  On the one hand, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
upheld its decisions in Thomas and Schor, despite the doctrinal incon-
sistency.84  Moreover, the Court has also stated that “[g]iven the ex-
tent to which this case is so markedly distinct from the agency cases 
discussing the public rights exception in the context of such a re-
gime . . . we do not in this opinion express any view on how the doc-
trine might apply in that different context.”85  The lack of clarity 
leaves numerous non-Article III adjudicatory bodies in a precarious 
position in regards to their constitutionality.  Without more infor-
mation from the Supreme Court, the lower courts are simply left with 
an incoherent doctrine that may or may not be interpreted broadly to 
invalidate a large proportion of congressionally created non-Article 
III adjudicatory institutions. 
A.  Federal Magistrates Act 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall and its re-
adoption of the more restrictive public rights analysis set forth in 
Northern Pipeline raises particular concerns regarding the validity of 
magistrate judges in the federal judiciary.  Established by Congress 
under the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, magistrate judges have the 
 
 82 See Chemerinsky, supra note 66, at 203 (“It is not possible to reconcile the functional ap-
proach in Thomas and Schor with the formalistic approach in Stern v. Marshall.”). 
 83 Id. at 203–04. 
 84 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615. 
 85 Id. 
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authority to carry out a number of responsibilities, which include 
“hear[ing] and determin[ing] any pretrial matter pending before the 
court,”86 and the power “to enter a sentence for a class A misdemean-
or in a case in which the parties have consented.”87  Moreover, section 
636(c)(1) of the Federal Magistrates Act states: 
Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate 
judge or a part-time United States magistrate judge who serves as a full-
time officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil 
matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially des-
ignated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he 
serves.88 
Put more simply, when the parties consent to having their case pro-
ceed before the magistrate judge, the magistrate judge has the au-
thority to exercise jurisdiction and to “direct the entry of a judgment 
of the district court in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.”89  If an aggrieved party chooses to appeal the decision of the 
magistrate judge, the party “may appeal directly to the appropriate 
United States court of appeals . . . in the same manner as an appeal 
from any other judgment of the district court.”90 
While the Federal Magistrates Act entrusts magistrate judges with 
significant authority to adjudicate and preside over civil and criminal 
proceedings in federal district court, magistrate judges do not possess 
Article III adjudicatory authority.  In fact, magistrate judges are ap-
pointed to eight-year terms by the district court judges in each United 
States district—similar to the way bankruptcy judges are appointed to 
fourteen-year terms.91  Despite the fact that magistrate judges do not 
have tenure or salary protection, they have authority to preside over 
both criminal and civil proceedings, and even enter final judgment in 
civil cases with the parties’ consent, including state law counterclaims. 
Under the rationale put forth by Chief Justice Roberts in Stern, 
which invalidated key provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, the Court 
may also find the Federal Magistrates Act unconstitutional.92  Magis-
trate judges have the authority to preside over both criminal and civil 
 
 86 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 87 Id. § 636(a)(5). 
 88 Id. § 636(c)(1). 
 89 Id. § 636(c)(3). 
 90 Id. 
 91 28 U.S.C. § 631(a), (e). 
 92 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2627 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[F]unctionally, bankruptcy judges 
can be compared to magistrate judges, law clerks, and the Judiciary’s administrative offi-
cials, whose lack of Article III tenure and compensation protections do not endanger the 
independence of the Judicial Branch.” (emphasis added)). 
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proceedings; they have the authority to adjudicate matters between 
private parties that involve private rights; and they have the authority 
to preside over jury trials and enter final judgment on state law claims 
with the parties’ consent.  More importantly, magistrate judges do 
not have lifetime appointment, and Chief Justice Roberts specifically 
emphasized in Stern that “the tenure and salary guarantees of Article 
III” are crucial to preserving the independence of the judiciary and 
to protecting individual interests.93 
In United States v. Raddatz, the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of section 636(b) of the Magistrates Act, which “authorizes 
a district court to refer such a motion to a magistrate and thereafter 
to determine and decide such motion based on the record developed 
before the magistrate, including the magistrate’s proposed findings 
of fact and recommendations.”94  The criminal defendant in Raddatz 
appealed the district court’s finding of guilt on the ground “that the 
review procedures established by section 636(b)(1) permitting the 
district court judge to make a de novo determination of contested 
credibility assessments without personally hearing the live testimony, 
violated . . . Art. III of the United States Constitution.”95  The Su-
preme Court disagreed and, instead, concluded that due process 
rights claimed by the defendant “[we]re adequately protected by 
§ 636(b)(1)” because “the statute grants the judge the broad discre-
tion to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate’s proposed findings.”96 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern, most federal cir-
cuits also upheld the constitutionality of the provisions of the Federal 
Magistrates Act which authorize the magistrate judge to preside over 
and enter final judgment in jury and non-jury trials.97  For example, 
in Wharton-Thomas v. United States, the Third Circuit found that the 
separation of powers concept “is not violated in the magistrate sys-
tem” because “[t]he only conceivable danger of a threat to the inde-
 
 93 Id. at 2609 (majority opinion) 
 94 447 U.S. 667, 667, 680–81 (1980). 
 95 Id. at 677. 
 96 Id. at 680. 
 97 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 
F.2d 108, 109–10 (2d Cir. 1984); Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir. 
1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1038 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 
1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 540 
(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 929–30 (3d 
Cir. 1983); but see Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 712 F.2d 
1305, 1307 (9th Cir. 1983), withdrawn, 718 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that section 
636(c) of the Federal Magistrates Act allowing magistrate judges, with consent of parties 
to litigation, to conduct civil trials and enter final judgments violated the Constitution). 
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pendence of the magistrate comes from within, rather than without 
the judicial department.”98  Similarly, in Geras v. Lafayette Display Fix-
tures, Inc. the Seventh Circuit upheld the Federal Magistrates Act 
based on its determination that magistrate judges functioned as ad-
juncts of the district court by “provid[ing] quicker and less costly al-
ternative to the usually more delayed adjudication in a district 
court.”99 
Technical Automation Services Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp. 
was the first case following Stern that raised the question of the au-
thority of the magistrate judge to enter a final judgment.100  In Tech-
nical Automation, which involved the appeal of summary judgment 
awarded to the insured in a contract dispute case, the Fifth Circuit 
sua sponte addressed the jurisdictional question of “whether, in the 
light of Stern v. Marshall, the magistrate judge had authority under 
Article III of the Constitution to try and enter judgment in the state 
law counterclaim in this case.”101  The parties in the case consented 
under section 636(c) of the Federal Magistrates Act to having the 
magistrate judge determine and enter final judgment as to “Tech-
nical Automation’s breach of contract, duty to defend, and duty to 
indemnify claims; . . . third party claims; and Liberty’s reformation 
counterclaim.”102 
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s concern 
that “even the slightest ‘chipping’ away of Article III can lead to ‘ille-
gitimate and unconstitutional practice.’”103  It also recognized the sim-
ilarities between bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges.104  Never-
theless, the court ultimately held that section 636(c) does not violate 
Article III of the Constitution.105  Two key factors influenced the 
court’s decision:  (1) the Supreme Court had not overruled the Fifth 
Circuit’s precedent in Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., which upheld the authority 
of magistrate judges to enter a final judgment on claims involving 
consenting parties; and (2) Stern had limited application to the con-
text of bankruptcy courts and, as such, did not affect the magistrate 
judges’ authority in the Fifth Circuit.106 
 
 98 Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 927 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted). 
 99 Geras, 742 F.2d at 1041. 
100 673 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 2012). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 403. 
103 Id. at 406. 
104 Id. at 407. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
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Even if the Fifth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of Stern is in line 
with those of the Supreme Court, it still does not explain why magis-
trate judges should be treated differently from bankruptcy judges.107  
Functionally, bankruptcy and magistrate judges perform essentially 
the same tasks and are permitted to exercise the same degree of au-
thority under the Federal Magistrates Act and the Bankruptcy Act, re-
spectively.  Thus, it does not make sense doctrinally and practically to 
separate bankruptcy courts and to treat them differently from all oth-
er non-Article III tribunals.  Although the Supreme Court as well as a 
number of the lower courts have attempted to distinguish administra-
tive agencies and magistrate judges, among others, from bankruptcy 
courts, they have not provided clear justification for such distinc-
tion.108  This uncertainty in the Supreme Court’s Article III jurispru-
dence raises serious concerns because it calls into question the consti-
tutionality of non-Article III tribunals. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Stern v. Marshall appears to revert back to a 
more restrictive Article III analysis through its application of Northern 
Pipeline’s public rights/private rights dichotomy.  In doing so, the 
Court creates a troubling doctrinal inconsistency through its adop-
tion of both a formalist and a functionalist approach.  This incon-
sistency raises serious concerns about the status of non-Article III ad-
judicatory bodies, and particularly magistrate judges who are 
functional equivalents of bankruptcy judges—carrying out similar 
tasks and possessing similar degrees of authority. 
While Chief Justice Roberts does attempt, albeit unsuccessfully, to 
mitigate the effects of the doctrinal inconsistency by purporting to 
limit the Court’s decision in Stern to bankruptcy courts, the incon-
sistency still remains.  Even though the Supreme Court tries to distin-
guish bankruptcy courts from administrative agencies and other legis-
lative bodies, it does not justify why the distinction is valid or how 
lower courts should go about applying Stern’s framework in other 
contexts.  Consequently, the Supreme Court in the coming terms 
 
107 See Joshua C. Gerber, Note, “Why the Fuss?”:  Stern v. Marshall and the Supreme Court’s Un-
derstanding of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 989, 990 (2013) (arguing 
“the Supreme Court applies a separate, stricter, and more formal interpretation of Article 
III when scrutinizing the boundaries of bankruptcy court jurisdiction than it applies when 
performing the same kind of analysis with respect to other non-Article III adjudicative 
bodies”). 
108 See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011) (recognizing administrative agen-
cies as adjuncts of the district court). 
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should address the doctrinal inconsistencies in Stern and better clarify 
the status of magistrate judges, as well as those of other non-Article 
III tribunals, and their ability to enter final judgments on state law 
counterclaims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
